Gellchom, thanks for your advice about writing a letter. Sadly, I left my regular doctor for another practice because of the same kind of issues I'm having with this one. It wasn't my experience that the doctor really cared, as I had tried to bring up the issues I was having several times. She only referred me to her office manager. My impression is they want to deal with being the doctor, not staff issues. Since the office manager is part of the problem (in both instances), I don't see any more attempts on my part at trying to ''illuminate'' the problem in her office as being any more than a wasted effort. Just because I care, doesn't mean the doctor does! I don't want to pursue any more time in this office. I would have a total of at least 7 more appointments (including surgeries and follow-ups) and I'm not willing to put up with the passive-aggressive, mean-girl, entitlement attitudes. Nothing will change. My husband noticed it quite clearly, within 10 minutes of walking in, and the general atmosphere was the same with at least three of those on staff. I gave it over an hour, and things just escalated from bad to worse. I have an appointment with my regular doctor next week. I've been trying to figure out how much to tell her. I'm sure she doesn't want all the gory details, but I do need a better referral! I'd rather work on it from that end, because I do have a regular relationship with my doctor, who has been very professional.

I got this from a newsletter which I highly recommend written by John Mauldin although I just read it for curiousity not investment advice It seems to illustrate Bear Sterns is just the begining and if interest rates go up more we will be in a pickle. Altough he seems to indicate at the end that interest rates will eventually go down in response to a slow down This Week in Outside the Box we Join Bill Gross of Pimco in his July 2007 Investment Outlook as he strives to address the implications of the Bear Stearns hedge fund debacle, the toxic waste that is Wall Streets' innovative derivative products and their respective valuation, rather, lack thereof. If Dear reader you have not been party to the excess of the Wall Street you may have not heard of the two Bear Stearns hedge Funds focusing on the subprime market that were subsequently liquidated on account of their inability to meet margin calls, thus wiping out investors. Mr. Gross believes that while significant, we ought not to look to Wall Street to see the repercussions of our excess but to the heart lands of America and the real estate there financed via subprime loans to witness the true folly of our capitalist ways. John Mauldin, Editor Looking for Contagion in All the Wrong Places Investment Outlook Bill Gross : July 2007 Whew, that was a close one! Ugly for a few days I guess, but it could have been much worse! No, I refer not to Paris Hilton upon her initial release from the LA County pokey after serving three days of hard time, but to the Bear Stearns/subprime crisis. Shame on you Mr. Stearns, or whoever you were, for scaring us investors like that and moving the Blackstone IPO to the second page of the WSJ. We should have had a week of revelry and celebration of levered risk taking. Instead you forced us to remember Long Term Capital Management and acknowledge once again (although infrequently) that genius, when combined with borrowed money, can fail. But (as the Street would have you believe), this was just a close one. Sure Bear itself had to come up with a $3 billion bailout, but folks, most of these assets are worth 100 cents on the dollar. At least that's how they have 'em marked! Didn't wanna sell any so that someone would think otherwise...no need to yell "fire" in a crowded theater 'ya know. After all, hasn't Ben Bernanke repeated in endless drones that financial derivatives are a healthy influence on the financial markets and the economy? And aren't these assets well...financial derivatives? Besides, I direct you to the investment grade, nay, in many cases AAA ratings of these RMBS (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities) and CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations) and defy you to tell me that these architects were not prudent men. (Sorry ladies, they are still mostly men!) Well prudence and rating agency standards change with the times, I suppose. What was chaste and AAA years ago may no longer be the case today. Our prim remembrance of Gidget going to Hawaii and hanging out with the beach boys seems to have been replaced in this case with an image of Heidi Fleiss setting up a floating brothel in Beverly Hills. AAA? You were wooed Mr. Moody's and Mr. Poor's by the makeup, those six-inch hooker heels, and a "tramp stamp." Many of these good looking girls are not high-class assets worth 100 cents on the dollar. And sorry Ben, but derivatives are a two-edged sword. Yes, they diversify risk and direct it away from the banking system into the eventual hands of unknown buyers, but they multiply leverage like the Andromeda strain. When interest rates go up, the Petri dish turns from a benign experiment in financial engineering to a destructive virus because the cost of that leverage ultimately reduces the price of assets. Houses anyone? Oh, I kid the Fed Chairman - and I should stop because this is no laughing matter, and somehow I have a suspicion that this "close one," this Paris Hilton charade of a crisis, is really so much more than just a 3 or 27 day lockup in the LA County jail. Those that point to a crisis averted and a return to normalcy are really looking for contagion in all the wrong places. Because the problem lies not in a Bear Stearns hedge fund that can be papered over with 100 cents on the dollar marks. The flaw resides in the Summerlin suburbs of Las Vegas, Nevada, in the extended city limits of Chicago headed west towards Rockford, and yes, the naked (and empty) rows of multistoried condos in Miami, Florida. The flaw, dear readers, lies in the homes that were financed with cheap and in some cases gratuitous money in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Because while the Bear hedge funds are now primarily history, those millions and millions of homes are not. They're not going anywhere...except for their mortgages that is. Mortgage payments are going up, up, and up...and so are delinquencies and defaults. A recent research piece by Bank of America estimates that approximately $500 billion of adjustable rate mortgages are scheduled to reset skyward in 2007 by an average of over 200 basis points. 2008 holds even more surprises with nearly $700 billion ARMS subject to reset, nearly ¾ of which are subprimes. It was not supposed to be this way. 1% teasers or 3% 2/28's were supposed to be rolled with no points into something resembling...well...1% teasers and 3% 2/28's. Instead today we have nearly 7% fixed rate mortgages and not a teaser to be found. Congress, regulators, even Fed officials are stepping in and warning mortgage originators (even mortgage buyers!) that they'd better be careful and only make good loans. Those nasty capitalists! They must have gotten carried away a few years ago. Somehow all those BMWs in the New Century parking lot in Irvine, California didn't attract much notice in 2006. Now, well, there's nary a Prius to be found there, but lots of outraged politicians in Washington, that's for sure. The right places to look for contagion are therefore not in the white-washed Bear Stearns hedge funds, but in the subprime resets to come and the ultimate effect they will have on the prices of homes - the collateral that's so critical in this asset-backed, and therefore interest-sensitive financed-based economy of 2007 and beyond. If delinquencies lead to defaults and then to lower home prices, then we have problems and the potential for an extended - not a 27-day Paris Hilton sentence. Take a look at Chart 1, which graphically points out the deterioration in subprime ARM delinquencies. Escalating delinquencies of course ultimately lead to escalating defaults. Currently 7% of subprime loans are in default. The percentage will grow and grow like a weed in your backyard tomato patch. Now I, the curmudgeon of credit, am as sure of this as I am that the sun will set in the west. The uncertain part is by how much. But look at it this way: using the current default rate of 7% (3-4% total losses), the holders of some BBB investment grade subprime-based CDOs will lose all of their moolah because of the significant leverage. No need to worry about fictitious 100 cents on the dollar marks here. One hundred percent of nothing equals nothing. If subprime total losses hit 10% then even some single-A tranches face the grim reaper. AAA's? Folks the point is that there are hundreds of billions of dollars of this toxic waste and whether or not they're in CDOs or Bear Stearns hedge funds matters only to the extent of the timing of the unwind. To death and taxes you can add this to your list of inevitabilities: the subprime crisis is not an isolated event and it won't be contained by a few days of headlines in The New York Times. And it will not remain confined to a neat little Petri dish in some mad financial derivative scientist's laboratory. Ultimately through capital market arbitrage it will affect risk spreads in markets completely divorced from U.S. housing. What has the Brazilian Real to do with U.S. subprimes? Nothing except many of the same bets are held in hedge funds that by prudence or necessity will reduce their risk budgets to stay afloat. And the U.S. economy? Of course it will be affected. Consumption will be reduced to say nothing of new home construction over the next 12-18 months. After all, attractive subprime pricing has been key to the housing market's success in recent years. Now that has disappeared. Importantly, as well, and this point is neglected by most pundits, the willingness to extend credit in other areas - high yield, bank loans, and even certain segments of the AAA asset-backed commercial paper market should feel the cooling Arctic winds of a liquidity constriction. If not taken too far - and there is no hint yet of a true "crisis" - these developments may be just what the Fed has been looking for: easy credit becoming less easy; excessive liquidity returning to more rational levels. Still, PIMCO looks for the Fed to issue an insurance policy in the form of lower Fed Funds at some point over the next 6 months. And what happened to our glass half-full secular thesis of last month? We still believe in strong global growth, but...as we also suggested...that the U.S. housing downturn will affect growth and short-term yields over the next year or so. We remain consistent and resolute. Contagion? Maybe, but you won't be finding it at "99.9%" pure Bear Stearns. Look for it instead, in the subprimely financed homes of Las Vegas, Rockford, Illinois, and Miami, Florida. This problem - aided and abetted by Wall Street - ultimately resides in America's heartland, with millions and millions of overpriced homes and asset-backed collateral with a different address - Main Street. William H. Gross Managing Director

chisue, we paid for all expenses not covered by academic scholarships. Until last winter, dd was somehow under the impression that her scholarships had paid for nearly everything, and so felt that she'd "earned" her way through college. She forgot we paid for textbooks, supplies, food, allowance, & housing costs as well as approx. 20% of tuition not covered by scholarships. We gave dd $10K when she turned 21, that she's invested, and have promised ds the same on his 21st. Over the years, we've also hired them for various jobs in order to fund about $10K into each one's IRA. For graduation, we've promised $10K to each. Dh will also sign over the titles to the cars they've been driving. It all sounds a bit much when I count it up. We're not wealthy, but we have been very frugal and dh deferred a lot of his compensation until the last couple of years. We haven't taken an overseas trip since our belated honeymoon, but we did just pay for one for our kids (their other graduation gift.) I drive an older and somewhat battered minivan, which dh has been bugging me to replace, but I've been waiting until the kids are out of college. Dh and I really struggled when we first married. Between uninsured major medical expenses, theft of vehicles, and other unexpected events, we nearly went bankrupt but managed to survive (barely.) My parents were very well off but never offered us any help, even though they frequently helped my older siblings (one of whom continues to count on their help today.) I'll probably be in my mid-50s when I inherit, and the money really won't mean much then. A tiny fraction of what I will receive would have made a world of difference back when we were skipping meals to pay the bills. Unfortunately, I think we've overdone giving to our own children. I was a strict mom when it came to their behavior, manners, academics, etc., but dh was usually a pushover about everything. They are honors scholars and have great careers ahead of them. We just need to get past this issue about selling that house. Dh & I also need to get over the mistake we made in buying our current too-large house. Dd was unhappy to hear that we intend to downsize within four yrs., yet at the same time she made it clear that she does not want to live with us. I'm fine with both kids living on their own next year, but it's a bit much to take when she says that she wants to live in our other house but not with us. Should dh end up "retiring early" we'd planned to move there. OP - so sorry to take over your thread. However, reading it has been a good lesson for me. I needed some fortification to withstand the boatload of tearful self-pity and dreadful imaginings from dd about how she will get mugged/shot/lose her job, etc. if we "kick" her out next year and she has to move into an apartment. I never thought that announcing the prospective sale of a house could be so emotional. This has also been a good reminder that acting out of guilt isn't good for anyone concerned.

Hi Landmarker, You described exactly what I said. It is a hedge, with fees going to the insurance co. taken off the upside. No, that is not what I said. You leave "the upside" as an ambiguous statement, while I am explaining the factual detail. The costs to manage the funds are *NOT* taken from the CLIENT'S gains, which are based on a fixed calculation tied to the performance of the index. Rather, the costs are paid from the company's own internal performance. The client is *NOT* exposed to the risks of direct investment in the securities (in this particular type of product.) There are 2 key points... 1. It costs money to peform this hedge It does NOT directly cost the client's money*, it is paid by the company's money. (*Given that the client keeps their time commitment to allow the company sufficient time to work the funds to earn enough internal returns, on average. The time commitment is *NOT* relative to performance, but a pre-specified concrete amount of time (typically from 3-10 years, contracted in advance.) 2. This hedge cannot come with a guarantee > the cost of borrowing. Currently individuals can take out 30 FRM loans at 4.5% or lower, and put that money to work at a guaranteed 7.2% growth rate for a 10 year term, and if done inside a ROTH IRA it grows tax free, and can be accessed to spend tax free. You *ARE* correct that no specific provider guarantees that the market will provide this opportunity... *HOWEVER*, the market is doing so right now on a very safe basis, at much lower costs than direct securities investments (of *ANY* level of sophistication.) There will be many days the hedge out peforms the S&P and there will be many days the S&P outpeforms the hedge. That depends on the time frame you look at. Your statement is correct in a blind one-annual basis. Taken at a string of consecutive years, the S&P has historically *NEVER EVER* outperformed the hedge on a 3-consecutive-year basis or longer. For those willint to take the short-term risks for the possibility of the short-term home runs... there is the lottery... or there is direct market investing. Either is attractive to some people. Neither is the long-term best choice. There will be no days the fees for investing in the S&P exceeeds the fees for investing in the hedge. That would be *every* day, if you are referring to the fixed-index annuities. So the question an investor needs to ask is do they get a benefit from the annuity (worth the cost?)... For many the answer is yes. For many more the answer will be no. That's why S&P 500 index is a more popular investtment than annuties. No, that's not why at all. It *IS* true that direct index investment is more popular, but the overwhelming reason is that the industry that promotes it makes *MUCH* more money by doing so, *AND* leaves the burden of downside risk on the shoulders of the clients. This creates a MASSIVE incentive for allegiance and promotion of the concept, and a MASSIVE incentive to keep client's money *AWAY* from the safer annuities with the same (and better) performance. Allowing funds into the annuities kills the golden goose of management fees for securities. It really is tantamount to the promotions of the lottery, and the securities world knows it quite well. Humans (a very unfortunately large number, anyway,) LOVE the thrill of the gamble, and the meme of "you gotta be in the game in order to win the home runs" keeps people in... to be fleeced over and over and over again. Its tragic that people only stop & think about it (if/when they think about it deeply at all) when the markets drop and they discover that THEY are the ones holding the bag all the way down, despite having paid 1-3% of their total funds in securities fees to the stock brokerage companies and their salesmen for years and years. One size definitely does not fit all... but unprotected and ungauranteed securities investment is playing with a very volatile fire... it burns even the sophisticated traders, and decimates the unsophisticated public. Cheers Dave Donhoff Leverage Planner