Defendant purchaser challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which found in favor of plaintiff seller in the seller's action to recover the balance of the purchase price of certain Russian rubles.
The seller's assignor actually had sold the rubles to the purchaser. On appeal, the purchaser’s small business lawyer argued that the evidence did not support the findings of a tender with intent to pass title of the rubles. The court reversed the judgment. The court found that it was clear that the judgment fixing the damages rested on the theory that there was a tender of the rubles to the purchaser with intent to pass title, which allowed the seller to recover the full contract price. The court found no evidence of a tender of any kind much less one made with the intent to pass title. The court also held that even though there was a defect in the purchaser's denial said defect was not construed as an admission that the rubles were tendered in any manner. The seller's assignor was at all times demanding payment but there was no evidence that a tender had been made. The court held that the seller's remedy was measured by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 3311 rather than Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 3310. The judgment in favor of the seller was reversed.
Appellant challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of Mendocino County (California), which found for respondent insurance company on his lawsuit for breach of contract and bad faith for failing to pay his claims under his insurance policy, claiming that the trial court erred as a matter of law in giving certain jury instructions resulting in prejudice to appellant.
Appellant bought health insurance from a salesman, who sold him a policy issued by respondent insurance company. Thereafter, appellant submitted a claim for a heart operation, and respondent refused to pay, arguing that the claim was excluded under its policy. Appellant filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith, and a jury verdict was found in respondent's favor. Appellant challenged the ruling, arguing that the trial court gave prejudicial jury instructions. The court held that the trial court gave a jury instruction, asking the jury to make a finding of whether the salesman's actions could be attributable to appellant or respondent, based upon a finding of agency. The court determined that the evidence at trial substantially proved that the salesman was respondent's agent, based upon the salesman's valid insurance license, authorized by respondent. The court stated that it was error for the jury to make a finding as to who's agent the salesman was, for as a matter of law, the salesman was respondent's agent. The court concluded that the jury instruction was prejudicial, and remanded for a new trial.
The court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the trial court erred in giving prejudicial jury instructions on a question as to who's agent was an insurance salesman, as the evidence clearly had shown that the salesman was respondent's agent. The court remanded for a new trial